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I. Introduction 
“When I reported the domestic violence, first to the police and then to my housing 
manager, I thought I was making myself and my children safer. Instead, my landlord 
threw us out of the apartment and we had nowhere to go.”1 
Supreme Court Justices, both houses of the federal legislature, and a growing 
number of independent studies agree that domestic violence is a growing issue in the 
United States that needs to be addressed.
2
 Domestic violence is the leading cause of 
injury to women in the United States.
3
 Three out of four American women will 
experience a violent crime at some point in their life.
4
 Four million American women are 
victims of domestic violence by the hands of their husbands or partners each year
5
, and 
an estimated quarter or these incidents leave the women in need of medical assistance.
6
 
                                                        
1 Private Housing Company Won’t Evict Domestic Violence Victims After ACLU Lawsuit, ACLU BLOG 
(February 26, 2008), http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/private-housing-company-won’t-evict-domestic-
violence-victims-after-aclu-lawsuit. 
2 See infra notes 3-8. 
3 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 631 (2000) (Justice Souter, dissenting) (citing S. REP. NO. 103-
138, at 38 (1993) (citing Surgeon General Antonia Novello, From the Surgeon General, U.S. Public Health 
Services, 267 JAMA 3132 (1992))). 
4 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 631 (Justice Souter, dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 103-395, at 25 (1993) (citing 
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice 29 (2nd ed. 1988))). 
5 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 631 (Justice Souter, dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 103-395, at 26 (citing 
Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical Assn., Violence Against Women: Relevance for Medical 
Practitioners, 267 JAMA 3185 (1992))).  
6 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 631 (Justice Souter, dissenting) (citing S. REP. NO. 101-545, p. 36 (1990) (citing 
Stark & Flitcraft, Medical Therapy as Repression: The Case of the Battered Woman, Health & Medicine 
(Summer/Fall 1982))). 
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Between two and four thousand women die every year as a result of domestic violence.
7
 
Further, this high frequency of domestic violence cases has a direct relation to the 
number of homeless women and children in America. Studies have found that as many as 
half of America’s homeless women and children are fleeing incidents of domestic 
violence.
8
 
Quinn Bouley became a victim of domestic violence at the hands of her husband 
on October 15, 2003.
9
 That night she called the police, fled her apartment, and filed a 
restraining order against her attacker.
10
 She was again victimized on October 18th at the 
hands of her landlord.
11
 The landlord handed her an eviction letter citing the incident of 
domestic violence as the main reason for his decision.
12
 This letter stated, “Agreement # 
10 on your lease states that ‘Tenant will not use or allow said premises or any part thereof 
to be used for unlawful purposes, in any noisy, boisterous or any other manner offensive 
to any other occupant of the building.’ Other tenants, and now myself included, feel 
fearful of the violent behaviors expressed.”13 
Instances of double victimization
14
 such as that described above result from an 
obvious gap in legislation. Double victimization stemmed from a crackdown on drug use 
                                                        
7 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 631 (Justice Souter, dissenting) (citing S. Rep. No. 101-545, at 36 (1990) (citing 
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, LEGAL REFORM EFFORTS FOR BATTERED WOMEN: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 
(Brooklyn Law School, 1990))). 
8 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 631 (Justice Souter, dissenting) (citing S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 37 (1990) (citing 
SCHNEIDER, supra). 
9 Bouley v. Young-Sabourin, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675, 677 (D. Vt. 2005). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 See Lenora M. Lapidus, Doubly Victimized: Housing Discrimination Against Victims of Domestic 
Violence, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 377 (2003). 
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and violence in public housing in the early 1990’s.15 In response to a public concern, 
legislation
16
 was passed mandating a “zero tolerance” or “one strike” policy in public 
housing, and many private landlords followed suit by drafting similar terms into their 
leases.
17
 The result was that many public and private housing leases then contained 
language that provided for eviction when a tenant, or any guest of that tenant, acted 
illegally or violently.
18
 This meant that victims of domestic violence could now be 
evicted from their housing because of the actions of their abusers.
19
Congress eventually 
realized the negative effects this policy had on victims of domestic violence, and added 
an amendment explicitly banning the application of these policies in such cases.
20
 
However, nothing was done to prevent the continuation of these policies in private 
housing.
21
  
This paper will first discuss the history of the “one strike policies” that lead to 
domestic violence related evictions in Part II.
22
 Part III will look into the protections 
currently available to domestic violence victims under the Fair Housing Act, and discuss 
why those protections have not been adequate in protecting them from eviction.
23
 Part IV 
will then discuss legislative attempts by the states to remedy this issue.
24
 Finally, part V 
                                                        
15 See infra Part II. 
16 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d(l). 
17 See Bouley, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 677. 
18 See infra Part II. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 See infra Part III. 
22 See infra Part II. 
23 See infra Part III. 
24 See infra Part IV. 
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of this paper will then propose a federal legislative remedy adopting models of successful 
private settlement terms that could be drafted under the power of the Commerce Clause.
25
 
II. History of One Strike Policies 
In 1988 the federal government set out to address rampant drug related or violent 
crime in public in federally funded housing.
26
 Consequently, Congress passed the Anti 
Drug Abuse Act in order to better provide public housing that is “decent, safe, and free 
from illegal drugs.”27 This act allowed for a termination of tenancy for anyone in public 
housing who engaged in criminal activity, as well as anyone whose guest or person under 
their control engaged in criminal activity.
28
 
The eviction policies under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act were not generally being 
enforced,
29
 and in 1996 President Clinton sought out to strengthen the legislation.
30
 
President Clinton called for a strict adherence to a “One Strike” policy,31 and worked 
with Congress to pass the Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996.
32
 
                                                        
25 See infra Part V. 
26 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 11901. 
27 Id. 
28 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5101, 102 Stat. 4181, 4300 (1988). 
29 Renai S. Rodney, Am I My Mother's Keeper? The Case Against the Use of Juvenile Arrest Records in 
One-Strike Public Housing Evictions, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 739, 744 (2004). 
30 President William Jefferson Clinton, State of the Union Addres (Jan. 23 1996) (transcript available at 
http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/New/other/sotu.html) (“And I challenge local housing authorities and tenant 
associations: Criminal gang members and drug dealers are destroying the lives of decent tenants. From now 
on, the rule for residents who commit crime and peddle drugs should be one strike and you're out.”); see 
also PRESIDENT CLINTON'S MEMORANDUM ON THE “ONE-STRIKE AND YOU'RE OUT” GUIDELINES, 1996 
PUB. PAPERS 521 (Mar. 28, 1996) (recognizing HUD's efforts to assist cities in providing “safer 
developments” but stating that “there remains too much public housing in this country that is ravaged by 
drugs, crime, and violence”). 
31 See President William Jefferson Clinton, State of the Union Addres (Jan. 23 1996) (transcript available at 
http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/New/other/sotu.html). 
3242 U.S.C.A. § 1437d; see also Elizabeth M. Whitehorn, Unlawful Evictions of Female Victims of 
Domestic Violence: Extending Title VII's Sex Stereotyping Theories to the Fair Housing Act, 101 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1419, 1435 (2007). 
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Because of these efforts, federal law currently requires that public housing agencies 
incorporate language into their leases which states that:  
“any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful 
enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any drug-related criminal activity 
on or off such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of 
the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control, 
shall be cause for termination of tenancy.”33  
Many private landlords soon followed suit by incorporating similar terms into their 
leases, such as the language mentioned in the introduction.
34
 
After the passage of the Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act, the 
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (hereinafter “HUD”) soon after issued 
guidelines on to this legislation which clearly defined how to enforce the policy.
35
 These 
guidelines define guest as “a person temporarily staying in the unit with the consent of a 
tenant.”36 Additionally, a person under tenant’s control is defined as anyone on the 
property with the consent of the tenant.
37
 The Supreme Court has upheld the statue, and 
determined that it allows for eviction resulting from the actions of the tenant or anyone 
who is a guest of the tenant.
38
 In Rucker the petitioners challenged the application of “one 
strike policies” against tenants whose family members or caregivers were found to 
possess drugs in or near the apartment complexes.
39
 These challenges claimed an 
unconstitutional taking of the tenant’s property in violation of the Due Process Clause, 
                                                        
33 42 U.S.C.A.§ 1437d(l)(6). 
34 See Bouley, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 677. 
35 24 C.F.R. § 5.100 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 See Department of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130 (2002) (“unambiguously requires 
lease terms that vest local public housing authorities with the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related 
activity of household members and guests whether or not the tenant knew, or should have known, about the 
activity.”). 
39 Id. at 128. 
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since they were losing a property interest due to actions that were not actually under their 
control.
40
 The Court held that it did not matter whether or not the tenant knew about or 
had control over the actions of their guest.
41
 The Supreme Court favored these “no-fault 
evictions”42 since a tenant who “cannot control drug crime, or other criminal activities by 
a household member which threaten health or safety of other residents, is a threat to other 
residents and the project.”43 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s reading of the statute opened up the 
application of “one strike policies” to female victims of domestic violence.44 While 
victims of domestic violence obviously do not have control over the actions of their 
attackers,
45
 the attackers generally do fall into the definition of “guest” or “person under 
tenant’s control” as outlined by the HUD.46 An abusive partner is generally invited into, 
or given permission to enter the apartment complex at one time, perhaps before they ever 
became physically abusive. In accordance with the Supreme Court’s strict literal reading 
of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act in Rucker, abusive intimate partners still qualify as a “guest” 
or “person under the tenant’s control” even once they lose that express permission to be 
on the property.
47
 
                                                        
40 Id. at 135. 
41 Id. at130. 
42 Id. at 135. 
43 Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 51560-01 (Oct. 21, 1991). 
44 See Whitehorn, supra note 32, at 1437. 
45 See Veronica L. Zoltowski, Zero Tolerance Policies: Fighting Drugs or Punishing Domestic Violence 
Victims?, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1231, 1258 (2003) (If anyone is said to be in “control” in a domestic 
violence relationship, it is undoubtedly the abuser.). 
46 24 C.F.R. § 5.100. 
47 See Rucker, 535 U.S at 125. 
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This is exactly what happened in the case of Ms. Tiffani Alvera.
48
 Ms. Alvera was 
assaulted by her then husband in their Creekside Village apartment on the morning of 
August 2, 1999.
49
 That same day she went to the hospital to treat her wounds, then went 
to the police station to obtain a temporary restraining order against her husband.
50
 Ms. 
Alvera gave notice of the restraining order to her landlord, and requested to transfer to a 
smaller apartment in the complex.
51
 A day later, a representative for the housing complex 
gave her a twenty-four hour eviction notice.
52
 That notice stated: “You, someone in your 
control, or your pet, has seriously threatened immediately to inflict personal injury, or has 
inflicted personal injury on the landlord or other tenants… Specific details: On August 2, 
1999, Humberto Mota reportedly physically attacked Tiffani Alvera in their apartment.”53 
The application of a “Zero-Tolerance Policy” to female victims of domestic 
violence like Ms. Alvera above had quickly become widespread. For that reason, 
Congress investigated the issue, and found a strong link between domestic violence and 
homelessness.
54
 In this study, forty-four percent of the cities surveyed listed domestic 
violence as their primary cause of homelessness.
55
 Congress found that, “Women and 
families across the country are being discriminated against, denied access to, and even 
evicted from public and subsidized housing because of their status as victims of domestic 
                                                        
48 Alvera v. Creekside Village Apts., HUD ALJ No. 10-99-0538-8 (U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 
Portland, Or., Oct. 22, 1999) available at http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/alvera-v-cbm-group-inc-et-al. 
49 Complaint, Alvera v. Creekside Village Apts., HUD ALJ No. 10-99-0538-8 (U.S. Dep't of Hous. & 
Urban Dev., Portland, Or., Oct. 22, 1999) available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/images/asset_upload_file457_33995.pdf. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 42 U.S.C.A. § 14043e(1). 
55 Id. 
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violence.”56 Further, Congress found that legal service providers had responded to almost 
one hundred fifty cases where the tenant was evicted due to domestic violence in the past 
year.
57
 Nearly one hundred other clients sought legal services when they were denied 
housing due to their status as victims of domestic violence.
58
 
In order to better protect the safety and provide long-term housing solutions for 
these victims,
59
 Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act of 2005 (hereinafter 
“VAWA”).60 VAWA explicitly states that “Zero-Tolerance Policies” can no longer be 
applied to criminal activity connected with domestic violence by a “guest” or a person 
under the control of the tenant.”61 VAWA also allows a landlord to bifurcate a lease to 
evict only the abuser in instances where both the abuser and the victim are on the lease.
62
  
Unfortunately, despite the provisions of VAWA, not all victims of domestic 
violence are protected against eviction for two reasons. First, eviction is still allowed if 
the landlord determines that allowing a continuation of tenancy could pose an actual or 
imminent threat to other tenants or employees of the housing agency.
63
 Second, VAWA 
regulates these practices by controlling the amount of grants a public housing project or 
federally assisted housing receives based on their adherence to prescribed domestic 
violence guidelines.
64
 However, because most private housing doesn’t receive any kind 
of federal subsidy, VAWA doesn’t apply. Since VAWA protection applies only to those 
                                                        
56 42 U.S.C.A. § 14043e(3). 
57 42 U.S.C.A. § 14043e(4). 
58 Id. 
59 42 U.S.C.A. § 14043e-1. 
60 See id. 
61 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d(l)(6). 
62 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d(l)(6)(B). 
63 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d(l)(6)(E). 
64 42 U.S.C.A. § 14043e-4. 
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living in public housing,
65
 it does not protect victims who live in private housing whose 
landlord added similar “Zero Tolerance” terms to their leases.66  
III. FHA and Disparate Impact Claims 
As a result of the gaps left even after the passage of VAWA, victims of domestic 
violence facing evictions in public housing have therefore looked to the Fair Housing Act 
(hereinafter “FHA”) for some protection. The FHA makes it illegal to discriminate in 
most housing situations on the basis of sex.
67
 The FHA applies to most private and public 
housing with a few exemptions.
68
 One such exemption is an owner-occupied dwelling 
with no more than four units.
69
 So long as a victim of domestic violence does not fall 
within an exemption of the Act, courts have determined that plaintiffs can bring a 
discrimination claim under the FHA based on the disparate impact theory.
70
 
Circuit courts are split as to exactly how to establish a prima facie case of 
disparate housing discrimination. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit has stated that, “A prima facie case of disparate impact housing discrimination is 
established by showing that a particular facially-neutral practice actually or predictably 
imposes a disproportionate burden upon members of the protected class.”71 Under this 
                                                        
65 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d(l) (“Each public housing agency shall…”). 
66 See Bouley, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 677; See also Rebecca Licavoli Adams, California Eviction Protections 
for Victims of Domestic Violence: Additional Protections or Additional Problems?, 9 HASTINGS RACE & 
POVERTY L. J. 1, 14 (2012). 
67 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604. 
68 42 U.S.C.A. § 3603. 
69 42 U.S.C.A. § 3603(b)(2). 
70 See Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977) 
(“We therefore hold that at least under some circumstances a violation of section 3604(a) can be 
established by a showing of discriminatory effect.”). 
71 Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 98 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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analysis, plaintiffs only need to show that housing practices disproportionately exclude 
members of a protected group.
72
 There is no need to show any discriminatory intent.
73
 
Surprisingly, the Seventh Circuit has determined that discriminatory intent is a 
necessary element of a disparate impact claim.
74
 That court has stated that a plaintiff must 
show four elements to establish a prima facie disparate impact claim in housing 
discrimination.
75
 The plaintiff must first point to the landlord’s specific policy that has a 
discriminatory effect.
76
 Second, the plaintiff needs to show some evidence of 
discriminatory intent.
77
 Third, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the landlord had some 
interest in taking the discriminatory action.
78
 Fourth, the plaintiff must show that relief 
would successfully remedy the problem.
79
 
Despite the courts’ differences over a requirement of discriminatory intent, the 
circuits do agree that once a prima facie case is established, the court should follow a 
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis.
80
 First, the plaintiff has the burden of 
showing a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence.
81
 The burden then shifts 
to the landlord defendant to show some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for his 
                                                        
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 See Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1290. 
75 Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1290. 
76 Id. at 1290. 
77 Id. at 1290 (note, the level of intent does not need to reach the level to satisfy the constitutional standard 
in Washington v. Davis. However, some lower level of discriminatory intent still must be shown.) 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
81 United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176, 1178 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting Pollitt v. Bramel, 669 F.Supp. 
172, 175 (S.D. Ohio 1987)). 
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action.
82
 If the defendant satisfies this burden, the plaintiff may then show that the 
legitimate reasons offered by the landlord are mere pretext.
83
 
One would think that a disparate impact claim would be quite easy to show in 
these cases since statistics show that women are overwhelmingly more likely to be 
victims of domestic violence. Studies have shown that women account for 85% of 
domestic violence victims.
84
 Indeed, studies show that in 2009, women were 5 times 
more likely than men to be the victims of domestic violence.
85
 In total, an estimated 1.3 
million women a year are victims of domestic violence.
86
 With such statistics it may 
appear victims of domestic violence facing eviction could easily prove disparate impact 
under the above analysis, however prevailing on such a claim has proven challenging. 
For a number of reasons
87
 First, in smaller apartment complexes, a Plaintiff’s claim may 
be the first and only instance where the landlord applied a “Zero Tolerance Policy” to a 
victim of domestic violence. When the plaintiff is unable to find other similarly situated 
victims, establishing that the single decision constitutes a “policy or practice” is nearly 
impossible.
88
 Second is the high cost of providing statistical evidence and expert 
testimony to show that women are disproportionately affected by domestic violence.
89
 
Third, since the issue of a disparate impact theory under the FHA has never reached the 
                                                        
82 Id.  
83 Id. 
84 Callie Marie Rennison, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Crime 
Data Brief, Intimate Partner Violence, 1993-2001 (2003) available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf. 
85 Jennifer R. Truman & Michael R. Rand, U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Victimization, 2009 (2010) 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2217. 
86 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Costs of 
Intimate Partner Violence Against Women in the United States (2003) available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/IPVBook-a.pdf. 
87 See Jenifer Knight & Maya Raghu, Advancing Housing Protections for Victims of Domestic Violence, 
COLO. LAW., Sept. 2007, at 77, 80. 
88 Id.  
89 Whitehorn, supra note 32, at 1425. 
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Supreme Court, there is still uncertainty among the district courts as to the exact 
standards of such a claim, or whether the claim is available at all.
90
 Finally, what may be 
the most difficult challenge is the lack of binding precedent to rely upon as the result of 
frequent settlements. 
The Alvera and Bouley cases previously mentioned both ended in settlement. In 
the Alvera case, the landlord agreed to no longer evict victims of domestic violence, nor 
discriminate against such victims in any way.
91
  The defendant also agreed to adopt and 
promulgate a new antidiscrimination policy throughout all of its properties. 
92
 The 
landlord also agreed to pay Ms. Alvera some confidential amount of compensatory relief 
and attorney fees.
93
 The landlords also explicitly did not admit to violating any statute, 
nor committing any tort against Ms. Alvera in the settlement.
94
 Because of this 
settlement, there is no current binding precedent establishing a successful disparate 
impact claim.
95
  
Similar settlement agreements seem to be the only result reached in such cases.  
Such results can be seen in Lewis v. North End Village,
96
 where the victim of abuse 
obtained a protection order against her ex-boyfriend.
97
 The boyfriend later returned to the 
                                                        
90 Id. 
91 Alvera v. C.B.M. Group – Federal Consent Decree, available online at: http://www.aclu.org/womens-
rights/alvera-v-cbm-group-federal-consent-decree 
92 Id. 
93  Id. 
94  Id. 
95 Eliza Hirst, The Housing Crisis for Victims of Domestic Violence: Disparate Impact Claims and Other 
Housing Protection for Victims of Domestic Violence, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 131, 145 (2003). 
96 See Lewis v. North End Village, No. 2:07-CV-10757 (E.D.Mich. 2007). 
97 See Memorandum for FHEO Directors Re: Assessing Claims of Housing Discrimination against Victims 
of Domestic Violence under the Fair Housing Act and the Violence Against Women Act, Sara K. Pratt, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Programs, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (February 9, 2011) available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/library/11-domestic-
violence-memo-with-attachment.pdf. 
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property, damaging a window and door in an effort to break in.
98
 The victim was evicted, 
and sued the property management company in federal court with the help of the ACLU 
of Michigan.
99
 Again, the parties reached a settlement agreement.
100
 Here, the private 
landlord agreed to not discriminate against victims of domestic violence in any way, as 
well as end policies of eviction of victims of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual 
assault, or stalking.
101
 The landlord also agreed to create and disseminate a domestic 
violence policy, which would serve as an amendment to all current leases, and be written 
into any new lease.
102
 The landlord further agreed to allow for victims of domestic 
violence to flee their abusers by requesting transfer to a different property managed by 
that group, or by choosing to terminate their lease entirely.
103
 
Advocates of domestic violence survivors declared the settlement a great 
victory.
104
 Tenants in these properties were now safe from eviction, and could use one of 
the landlord’s 543 other units to relocate if needed.105 Ms. Lewis herself stated, “I feel 
great because they adopted new policy changes and it can help other women or men in 
the situation that I was in so they won’t have to go through the things that I went 
through.”106 However, the settlement was not reached until nearly two years after the date 
of her eviction.
107
 As a result of the eviction, Ms. Lewis and her children were forced to 
                                                        
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 See Settlement Order, Lewis v. North End Village, No. 2:07-CV-10757 (E.D.Mich. 2007) available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/images/asset_upload_file733_34211.pdf. 
101 Id. at 2. 
102 Id. at 4. 
103 Id. at 3. 
104 See Selene Kaye, Fair Housing Settlement a Victory for Domestic Violence Survivors, ACLU BLOG (Jul. 
25, 2008, 3:19PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/fair-housing-settlement-victory-domestic-
violence-survivors. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Private Housing Company Wont Evict Domestic Violence Victims After ACLU Lawsuit, supra note 1. 
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move into a shelter.
108
 She was eventually able to find a new apartment and childcare, 
however they were much more expensive and further from her job.
109
 
While Ms. Lewis’ settlement was able to provide for greater protection for 
victims of domestic violence living in a property managed by her landlord, the case still 
settled, and therefore fell short of setting any binding legal precedent. Any similarly 
situated victim of domestic violence
110
 who does not live in the property covered by the 
settlement can still face eviction, the cost of litigation, and the years of uncertainty and 
danger that come along with homelessness.  
These female victims of domestic violence could be more likely to accept 
settlement agreements due to the financial situations that many of these victims find 
themselves in. Abusers often control the finances of their victims, or even go as far as 
prohibiting them from working.
111
 These attempts to economically control victims leave 
many without any money when separating from their abusers.
112
 Victims will most likely 
not want to, or not be able to, go through the time and expense of litigation, and will 
favor a quick and favorable settlement.   
IV. State Corrective Measures 
A. California 
The State of California recently recognized the overall lack of protections 
available to victims of domestic violence facing eviction, and passed state protections 
                                                        
108 Id.  
109 Id. 
110 Meaning any victims not covered by VAWA as discussed above. 
111 Hirst, supra note 95, at 133-34. 
112 Id.  
 14 
which became effective on January 1, 2011.
113
 The California Legislature found that 
domestic violence impacts one in three households, and determined that safe housing for 
these victims is essential for their recovery.
114
 Further, they found that many landlords 
were still able to evict victims of domestic violence based on complaints of noise, 
fighting, or repeated police visits even though the incidents were crimes committed 
against the victims.
115
 
The California statute prohibits any landlord
116
 from evicting a tenant or refusing 
to renew a tenant’s lease because of an act committed against that tenant that constitutes 
domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking.
117
 However, this legislation comes with a 
number of requirements and exceptions.
118
 First, in order for a victim to have this statute 
apply, they must have the incident documented in either a police report or a restraining 
order against the attacker.
119
 Second, the statute will only apply to incidents where the 
attacker is not a named party in the lease.
120
  
In the event that the victimized tenant is able to show the above two steps, a 
landlord may still be able to evict. The statute explicitly still allows eviction or refusal to 
renew a lease if the victim allows the person who committed the acts to revisit the 
property.
121
 Further, a landlord may still evict if he “reasonably believes that the presence 
of the person against whom the protection order has been issued or who was named in the 
                                                        
113 See generally, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161.3. 
114 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161.3., Legislative Findings: Section 1 of Stats.2010, c. 626 (S.B.782)(a-b). 
115 Id. at (d). 
116 See Adams, supra note 66, at 19 (The statute applies to both public and private landlords. However, 
most victims of domestic violence suing public landlords will rather rely on VAWA as it seems to provide 
stronger protections.). 
117 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161.3(a). 
118 See Id. 
119 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161.3 (a)(1). 
120 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161.3 (a)(2). 
121 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161.3 (b)(1)(A). 
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police report of the act or acts of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking poses a 
physical threat to other tenants, guests, invitees, or licensees, or to a tenant's right to quiet 
possession.”122 
 This statute is obviously flawed, and most likely will offer little to no protection 
additional protection to victims of domestic violence. The most obvious hole in the 
statute is that it does not protect victims who currently live with their abuser.
123
 This 
shows a fundamental misunderstanding of domestic violence on the part of the California 
legislature, and overlooks the fact that most victims of domestic violence live with their 
abuser.
124
 Also problematic is the landlord’s ability to evict the victim if they “allow” 
their abuser to “visit” the property.125 This eliminates protection for any victims who 
wish to continue any kind of a relationship with their former abuser.
126
  
 Complete separation from an abusive partner is an unrealistic expectation placed 
on victims of domestic violence by the California Statute.
127
 A victim of constant 
domestic abuse is generally isolated and led to the belief that she cannot survive on her 
own.
128
 There are a number of reasons why a victim might chose not to, or be unable to, 
immediately end all contact with their abuser.
129
 One of the most significant reasons a 
victim might not leave their abusive partner is a fear of separation assault, or a more 
                                                        
122 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161.3 (b)(1)(B). 
123 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161.3 (a)(2). 
124 Adams, supra note 66, at 19. 
125 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161.3(b)(2). 
126 See Adams, supra note 66, at 19. 
127 See generally Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A 
Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1232 (1993). 
128 Adams, supra note 66,  at 20. 
129 Id. 
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intense physical retaliation to her decision to leave.
130
 These fears are generally not 
unreasonable, as most deaths from domestic violence come from a partner after the 
relationship has been severed.
131
  Victims may also lack the economic resources to 
separate from their abuser.
132
 Without such resources, it may be impossible for a victim 
to support themselves and their children with basic necessities such as food, childcare, 
medical expenses, and paying for a residence on their own.
133
 Some victims may also not 
want to completely cut ties with their abuser due to concerns as to the welfare of their 
children.
134
 Some women may believe that separating their child from his or her father 
completely will have a detrimental effect on the child.
135
 Some other factors that could 
contribute to a victim choosing not to leave their abuser could be an emotional 
attachment to the abusive partner,
136
 hope and optimism that the relationship will get 
better,
137
 and racial or cultural views of domestic relationships.
138
 
This section of the statute also assumes that a victim is in control of her attacker’s 
access to her property.
139
 Especially in cases of stalking or sexual assault, it is impossible 
to imagine how this could be accurate. The misguided assumption that the victims are in 
control of their attackers is essentially what caused the issue of double victimization in 
the first place.
140
  
                                                        
130 Dutton, supra note 127, at 1232. 
131 Id. 
132 Dutton, supra note 127, at 1233. 
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134 Dutton, supra note 127, at 1234. 
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 Allowing landlords to evict victims because their attackers pose a possible threat 
to other tenants safety or quiet enjoyment is the most problematic area of the statute.
141
 It 
is hard to see how this statute would then be able to protect any victims of domestic 
violence from eviction since those are usually the reasons that a landlord chooses to evict 
in the first place.
142
 In many apartment complexes, rooms are in close proximity, and 
neighboring tenants may complain of shouting, breaking glass or furniture, or frequent 
slamming of doors after incidents of domestic violence.
143
 Landlords generally evict 
victims of domestic violence because they are concerned that the abuser’s violence could 
harm another tenant or other tenant’s property, and because other tenants are usually 
frightened by the noise coming from incidents of domestic violence, or the actual 
witnessing of the acts.
144
 With all of the limitations and exceptions to this statute, it is 
hard to see how it provides any protection to victims of domestic violence at all. 
 B. Other State Legislation 
 A number of other states have also realized that evictions of victims of domestic 
violence continue to be a serious problem. These states have passed statutes in an attempt 
to put an end to such evictions, however they are similar to California’s statutes in that 
they realistically offer very little protection to victims. Colorado has passed legislation 
stating that domestic violence cannot be a basis for landlord possession in the eviction 
process.
145
 However, Colorado requires that there be some form of documentation such 
                                                        
141 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161.3(b)(2). 
142 Adams, supra note 66, at 22. 
143 Adams, supra note 66, at 23. 
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as a police report or protection order.
146
 Minnesota simply bars a residential landlord 
from evicting a tenant due to a phone call to the police for emergency assistance in 
relation to an incident of domestic abuse.
147
 A Wisconsin statute seems to offer even less 
protection, simply sating that, “No claim that an individual's tenancy would constitute a 
direct threat to the safety of other persons or would result in substantial damage to 
property may be based on the tenant's status as a victim of domestic abuse, sexual assault, 
or stalking.”148 This statute obviously leaves out any other reason a landlord would chose 
to evict such as nuisance due to the noise levels coming from such incidents, or eviction 
due to illegal activity. 
 A few states have passed legislation stating that domestic violence can be raised 
as a defense in an eviction action. A Washington statute states that a household member’s 
status as a victim to domestic violence can serve as a defense to a state action to remove 
the tenant and regain possession.
149
 However, the statute then explicitly points out that it 
doesn’t prohibit any “adverse housing decisions based upon other lawful factors within 
the landlord’s knowledge.”150 It is unclear exactly what these other lawful factors might 
be, and how a court might decide a case where a victim of domestic violence is evicted 
from other lawful factors such as nuisance coming from the incidents of domestic 
violence. New Mexico offers a similar defense to such actions.
151
 
                                                        
146 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-40-104(I)-(II). 
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 The general ineffectiveness of these statutes can be seen in the lack of cases that 
apply them.
152
 In searching for any reported or unreported case, I have only found one 
that mentions any interpretation of one of the above-mentioned statutes.
153
 In that case, as 
soon as the landlord was informed of the statute he decided to drop the eviction action.
154
 
There are a few possible explanations for this lack of case law supporting these statutes. 
First, this type of case simply may never make it to court, or if it does, it may note make 
it past the trial level.
155
 Second, landlords may simply chose not to proceed with eviction 
actions once confronted with such statutes.
156
 Third, tenants may be unaware of their 
rights, and simply move out once evicted.
157
 Fourth, since many of theses statutes require 
some type of reporting to authorities, many women may not be covered by them due to a 
resistance to end the relationship with their abuser as explained above.
158
 No matter what 
the exact reasoning is for this lack of case law, it is clear that states offer inconsistent and 
often ineffective protection to victims of domestic violence who then face eviction. 
 V. Recommendation 
As demonstrated above, the currently available federal and state protections are 
simply not working. The only way to assure protection for all victims of domestic 
violence from eviction is to pass new Federal Legislation. Since the only instance that I 
have found where victims are given complete protection is in the settlement of Lewis,
159
 I 
recommend that this legislation follow the guidelines set forth in that document. This 
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legislation should offer complete protection from discrimination in procuring a place to 
live, assure protection from eviction as a response to domestic violence, allow for 
bifurcation of the lease so the abuser can leave, and allow for relocation to another 
apartment or termination of the lease entirely. This Legislation should go even further 
than that settlement and punish landlords who do continue these evictions. In many cases, 
the time immediately following eviction can be the worst for victims who would then 
need to enter a shelter before they could commence litigation and avail themselves of the 
protections offered.
160
 If harsh civil penalties were made available it would ensure the 
safety of victims of domestic violence and possibly mark the end of such double 
victimization. This Federal Legislation could follow the New York legislatures lead in 
allowing treble damages for certain offenses by landlords.
161
 
This legislation could be a valid exercise of the Interstate Commerce Clause. In a 
dissenting opinion joined by three other Justices, Justice Souter makes a compelling 
argument that regulating gender violence is within congress’ power under the Commerce 
Clause.
162
 Justice Souter points out that the government spends somewhere between five 
and ten billion dollars a year on health care, criminal justice, and other social costs of 
domestic violence.
163
 The issue in that case was whether or not a civil remedy was 
available to a victim alleging rape.
164
 The majority seemed to base its determination on 
the fact that gender-motivated crimes of violence are not an economic activity.
165
 
However, Congress would be able to make a much stronger case that the regulation of 
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evictions of victims of domestic violence is an economic activity that directly relates to 
interstate commerce. These victims may have to cross state lines to find new housing. 
Such considerations could be enough to gain the Supreme Court’s support of such a rule. 
Opponents to such a rule could point out that it puts too much of a burden on 
landlords, the enforcement might prove costly, or that it could allow for a continued 
nuisance to nearby residents. While all valid concerns, the interest of protecting victims 
of domestic violence from facing homelessness and the high costs of litigation should 
prevail. 
While it is true that such legislation would put somewhat of a burden of landlords, 
there are a few different tort theories that support the landlords being the responsible 
party. One well-recognized tort theory is “least-cost avoider.”166 This theory essentially 
states that where two parties could possibly avoid some type of an injury, the party who 
is likely to incur the lease expense in doing so should be the responsible party.
167
 In 
Tennessee Trailways, Inc. v. Ervin the injury was caused by a bus traveling down a 
highway at 75 miles per hour colliding with a motorcycle that puttered out into traffic.
168
 
There, since the cost of the bus constantly traveling down the highway at a slow enough 
speed to avoid any type of collision was much higher than the cost of the motorcycle to 
take care whenever entering a highway, the liability was determined to be with the 
motorcycle driver.
169
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In the present case, we must examine the costs of a landlord not evicting a victim 
of domestic violence, versus the cost of the victim putting a swift end to, or preventing 
domestic violence all together. The cost of a landlord not evicting a tenant who is a 
victim of domestic violence is relatively low. While the case could arise where there are 
so many complaints of noise coming from the apartment that the landlord could lose an 
adjoining tenant, this kind of a situation would be rare and still not all that costly. For the 
most part, it is hard to imagine any cost at all coming from simply allowing a tenant to 
remain in their home. On the other hand, the cost of a victim of domestic violence ousting 
her abuser before any reports reached the landlord could be extremely high. As noted 
above, the final separation abuse is usually the most sever, and is often when we see 
women lose their lives to domestic violence.
170
 Therefore, it is clear that under the “least-
cost avoider” theory, the landlord should be the party held responsible if an eviction as a 
result of domestic violence were to occur. Avoidance of such practices would cost the 
landlord next to nothing, while they could cost the victim of domestic violence her life. 
These landlords are also the party in the best position to handle any kind of a 
financial burden after such an incident of domestic violence occurs. If we look at these 
incidents after the domestic violence has occurred, there are essentially two options. First, 
we could allow the victims of domestic violence to continue to be evicted, thereby 
placing the costs on the victims’ shoulders. The second option would be to require the 
landlords to allow these victims to stay, and place the burden on the landlords. Looking at 
the issue through a strictly financial lens, the landlords are much more likely to be able to 
incur these costs. As mentioned above, female victims of domestic violence are likely to 
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have suffered from financial as well as physical abuse, and have little to no money 
available to support themselves.
171
 These women simply cannot handle being kicked to 
the curb by their landlords, and would most likely have to face homelessness. On the 
other hand, if some financial costs were placed on the landlords, it is only likely that they 
would only see a slightly lower profit margin on their investment properties. Therefore, if 
the legislature is faced with a choice as to who should have to bear some kind of a 
financial burden, the landlords are obviously more capable of incurring such a cost. 
Further, Congress has already expressed a strong government interest in providing 
safe and reliable housing for victims of domestic violence in passing the Violence 
Against Women Act.
172
 If the recommended legislation were passed, it would simply 
ensure that the government is better able to protect such an interest in the future. As 
described above, there have been a number of attempts to provide protection to victims of 
domestic violence from both the federal government and from the states.
173
 It is 
unfortunate that previous efforts have fallen short. New federal legislation, as I have 
recommended above, could be the only was of assuring that these protections are finally 
available to those who need them the most. 
VI. Conclusion 
Victims of domestic violence living in private housing are still offered little 
protection from eviction. The federal government essentially created the problem by 
enacting the Anti-Drug Abuse Act and enforcing “Zero Tolerance Policies.” Congress 
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realized the negative impact such legislation was having on victims of domestic violence, 
and sought to remedy the problem by enacting VAWA. However, VAWA however only 
applied to the public housing that required the “Zero Tolerance Policies” and not the 
private landlords who copied such terms into their leases, so a large number of victims 
were left unprotected. 
Advocates then tried to apply the FHA and disparate claims to protect these 
victims. These attempts however have proven unsuccessful. There is still much 
uncertainty as to exactly what standards apply to these claims, and those claims that are 
well pled have all ended in settlement. While these settlements have certainly improved 
the living conditions for the victims that they directly apply to, they are not binding 
precedents that can apply to other domestic violence survivors. 
States have recognized that there is still a need for protection for these victims, 
and some states such as California have attempted to offer that protection in the form of 
legislation. However, it is still unclear if such state statutes have provided for any 
additional help at all. Further, not many states have passed statutes similar to California, 
so victims living outside of those few states remain unprotected. 
There are still far too many victims of domestic violence left unprotected from 
eviction under current federal and state legislation. The federal government needs to take 
action, and ensure that all victims of domestic violence are not forced into homelessness 
because of the actions of their attackers. 
 
